

W2I Project Report, Fall 2007

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Prepared by Avi Goldberg

Introduction

This report presents summaries and analyses of key material compiled by the Will to Intervene (W2I) Project contributors to date, in a format that is intended to be useful to the W2I research team.¹ The report refers to, and builds on, previously produced W2I documents that are archived at MIGS. All previously produced W2I documents referred to in this report will be cited in italics. While this report provides an overview of all core W2I work conducted as of December, 2007, the new research team is advised to study previously produced material as comprehensively as possible.

The report consists of the following sections: W2I Project research and policy objectives, overview of W2I literature analysis and emergent conceptual themes, preliminary potential interviewees, preliminary potential interview questions, and W2I Project strategic recommendations.

W2I Project Research and Policy Objectives

The most comprehensive statements of the central research and policy objectives of the Will to Intervene Project are contained within the *W2I Research Project Proposal*. The proposal stresses that W2I is an applied research effort to operationalize key principles of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative that were endorsed by world leaders at the UN World Summit in 2005 (p.2).² In short, by conducting interviews with American and Canadian politicians, bureaucrats, and NGO practitioners who were engaged with decision making vis-à-vis the Rwanda and Kosovo crises in the 1990s, W2I will develop practical policy recommendations and tools targeted to multiple North American advocacy constituencies—within government, the NGO community, academia, media, and faith-based communities—that are working to push their governments to develop and act on the political will to intervene in apprehended cases of genocide and mass atrocity crime.

To achieve its policy goals, W2I will conduct 60 interviews with respondents who can speak knowledgeably and candidly on American and Canadian government decision making in relation to the 1990s crises in Rwanda and Kosovo. While it is essential to identify and reach as many key US and Canadian government decision makers as possible, it is also important to include a sub-set of influential NGO practitioners in W2I interviews. By conducting interviews with both government and NGO officials, and informed through ongoing consultations with members of the Research Steering Committee (RSC), W2I's methodology will gain insights about US and Canadian decision making processes and challenges in both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' directions.

¹ Please note that, in addition to the W2I Project Report, there is an additional guide report that presents an overview of MIGS administrative and organizational practices and processes with which members of the W2I Project team are to be familiar.

² The R2P concept was initially proposed in the final report of the Canadian government sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

Moving beyond the basics contained in the W2I proposal, and to avoid duplication, the next section presents an overview of the project's research and policy objectives as they have been conceptualized and/or refined during the fall, 2007.

Research and Policy Issues, Fall 2007

While there have been no major changes made to W2I's research and policy objectives in fall, 2007, a number of refinements or issues have emerged that will require sorting out by the research team as it begins to execute the next phases of the project. Major outstanding research and policy-related issues are listed below.

- **Planning to include government *and* NGO respondents in the list of interviewees:** The W2I research team will have to carefully weigh available resources and project timelines and goals in determining how many NGO practitioners to include in the interviews. If the goal is to conduct 30 interviews in each country (or another determined ratio that makes sense) this number can easily be exhausted on political actors alone. In some cases (especially in the US, see list of potential interviewees below), government actors may have been connected with the humanitarian NGO community during the Rwanda/Kosovo crises and they can thus provide good insights on US decision making processes. As the process of arranging and conducting interviews is unfolding, the W2I research team will have to pay close attention to the project and policy-level implications of proportioning interviews according to the top-down and bottom-up research objectives.
- **Paying attention to US (and Canadian?) election cycles:** The W2I research team will have to confront how the US election in 2008 affects the project's ability to arrange and conduct interviews. The most basic question is time. In an election year, will prominent government officials (active and retired) have the time to be interviewed? Are there times in the election cycle (primaries in key states, party conventions) that should be avoided if at all possible? Are issues like humanitarian intervention/R2P/foreign policy/Darfur being discussed during the campaign? Does this help or hinder the project's aims to discuss the lessons of Rwanda and Kosovo? These are some key questions that should be worked into research strategizing. Also, at the moment, a Canadian election is not on the horizon. This can change quickly, and given ongoing debates about Canada in Afghanistan, many these types of questions and issues are also relevant to the Canadian component of W2I.
- **Situating W2I within broader R2P research/advocacy projects:** W2I is not the only project working to operationalize R2P in North America. In fall, 2007, W2I/MIGS began to network with those responsible for coordinating R2P academic and advocacy projects (Weiss & the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, Scheffer's annual conference at the

University of Chicago, the R2P advocacy report published in November 2007), and efforts should be made to maintain and develop these connections. There are four main issues to think about in relation to networking with other R2P projects: 1) The W2I research team should continue to work on being aware of all projects addressing R2P with the aim of defining W2I's unique contribution to a larger campaign as tightly and comprehensively as possible; 2) By networking with additional R2P projects, W2I can aim publicize its efforts as broadly as possible; 3) By taking advantage of material produced by other projects, W2I will avoid expending effort that 'reinvents the wheel.' There may be information on particular topics of interest to W2I that has already been compiled and this should be explored to avoid spending time gathering materials and information that already exists. This can include anything from thematic ideas to sources of funding; 4) Do additional R2P projects contain information or insights on advocacy processes or suggestions that W2I can adapt to its own objectives?

- **W2I requires Concordia University research ethics approval:** Because W2I will be interviewing human subjects, W2I will have to submit the proper ethics approval forms to Concordia before interviews can be conducted. Copies of relevant forms have been downloaded to the W2I folder on the MIGS computer and hard copies of some of the documents have been placed in the filing cabinet. The W2I file on the MIGS computer also contains copies of ethics approval forms completed by Erin Jessee, a former W2I researcher and PhD student of Professor Chalk. These can be consulted for guidance. A member of the W2I research team should be assigned the task of seeking Concordia University research ethics approval immediately.

- **Duration/number of interviews with respondents and pilot interviews:** Interview times granted with high-level officials are usually quite short. In any interview, moreover, time always moves more quickly than expected. This is especially the case with loquacious respondents. Will it be possible to interview key respondents more than one time if needed? This question has to be assessed reasonably in light of W2I resources and the availability of different respondents. Interviewers will have to be prepared for interviews with a set of themes that absolutely must be dealt with and those that can be dropped if time becomes a factor. In addition to forethought into these issues, it was determined that W2I would attempt to conduct some pilot interviews in Canada leading up to the beginning of the full interview phase. Pilot interviews can be arranged with respondents who can provide key information on relevant issues but who are not the top respondents sought on the core issues. The W2I research team can use pilot interviews to: 1) learn about the issues and about potential additional respondents; 2) to test ideas to be later discussed with higher-level officials; 3) to gain knowledge of the amounts of time it can take to get through certain

interview questions and topics that can be used in planning and carrying out subsequent interviews with higher-level officials. These issues suggest that the research team should discuss and develop a systematic methodology to use in planning and executing the interview phase of the project.

- **Thinking creatively about policy recommendations:** W2I aims to produce policy recommendations that are relevant to government decision makers as well as to NGO advocates, media, and other civil society actors committed to pressing governments to act in cases of genocide and mass atrocity crime. To this end, the W2I research team should keep the following in mind as it executes the project: 1) Questions to respondents have to be tailored to each constituency to take into consideration how decision making looks from the vantage point of each type of actor (leader, MP, member of Congress, bureaucrat, adviser, NGO leader) being interviewed; 2) Examine applied reports and policy documents released in relation to other social issues for ideas on particular policy suggestions and tools and on how to best present and publicize policy recommendations and tools to different audiences; 3) Think outside the box, especially in relation to young people, new media technologies, and other analogous examples of advocacy. How can the internet be harnessed for policy advocacy? The case of Darfur advocacy suggests that, for this issue, many college students have become active and politicized in ways this constituency was not in recent years. Can the internet and younger constituencies be mobilized on the issue of genocide/W2I/R2P in new, creative ways?
- **Research Steering Committee (RSC):** If designed and executed well, the RSC will: 1) allow the W2I research team to gain valuable feedback from various experienced professionals on its work, ideas, and outputs; 2) be a valuable experience for its participants; 3) will help gain additional exposure for W2I/MIGS. In planning the first RSC, the W2I research team should think carefully about the meeting's topic and about the background of the invited guests. What is the best format to use during the consultation meeting? Should all members participate at the same time or should there be components of the meeting in which members break up into smaller discussion groups on the basis of particular themes and individual expertise? Is there thought-provoking information/material that can be supplied to RSC participants in advance of the meetings to prepare them for the discussions? How long should RSC meetings be? The W2I research team should strategize on ways to get RSC members engaged and interested in helping the project achieve its goals by allowing them to give their open and honest feedback and advice about the research and thematic topics under discussion.
- **Project timetable:** While W2I officially launched in September, 2007, project contributors revised the project's timetable in December, 2007. The revised timeline was further discussed and finalized at a W2I project

meeting on January 3, 2008. A copy of the new timeline is archived in the W2I folder on the MIGS computer. As soon as the W2I research team is fully assembled, the project will be able to follow the newly revised timetable. The research team should familiarize itself with key milestones and plan and execute its work accordingly.

Summary

This section has presented the central research and policy goals of the W2I Project and listed the key research and policy-related issues and challenges that were identified and discussed by project contributors in fall, 2007. With the exception of the project's timeline, no major changes have been proposed to the research methodology and policy goals of W2I. A series of important concerns and tasks has been enumerated, and these will require follow-up and tracking by the assembled research team in 2008.

The subsequent sections of this report delve more directly, and in greater detail, into substantive themes and questions with which members of the W2I research team will grapple as they plan to convene the first RSC consultation and to commence the interview phase of the project. In the next section, the current state of W2I thematic content is highlighted in an overview of the W2I literature analysis conducted to date. The overview presents and discusses interim conclusions and research/advocacy concepts emerging from the analysis.

Overview of W2I Literature Analysis & Emergent Conceptual Themes

The original goal of W2I's literature analysis was to focus primarily on scholarly and secondary sources addressing US and Canadian decision making in the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo and to review the literatures on additional cases and themes relevant to the research and policy objectives of the project.³ The universe of potentially reviewable literature is outlined in the W2I Literature Analysis Control Schedule in Appendix A of this report.⁴ To date, three reports and/or summaries of the literature analysis have been completed: Erin Jessee produced *W2I Project Burundi, Somalia & Rwanda Literature Analysis*, Richard Pilkington produced *W2I Project Kosovo Report*, and Avi Goldberg produced *W2I Annotated Bibliography, Fall 2007* and *W2I Literature Analysis, Fall 1997: Interim Conclusions*. Whereas Jessee's and Pilkington's contributions provide comprehensive background discussions of the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo, Goldberg's contributions draw specific interim conclusions on US decision making on Rwanda and Kosovo from Jessee's and Pilkington's work, present interim conclusions from the reviewed literatures on civil society advocacy (including some treatments of Darfur advocacy and analogous cases of human rights and environmental advocacy), and make a preliminary foray into literature considering Canadian policy and

³ Wherever possible, W2I aims to identify and study relevant primary documents.

⁴ After completing the literature analysis of Rwanda and Kosovo, W2I contributors determined that the next most important areas to study would be the literatures on US and Canadian decision making vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia and Darfur, NGO advocacy, and the analogous cases of civil society advocacy for government policy intervention (e.g. HIV/AIDs and global warming).

decision making on humanitarian intervention in general and on the case of Kosovo in particular.⁵

In the following sub-sections, this report presents an overview of the main findings of the literature reports and/or summaries cited above.⁶ The sub-sections are organized according to the themes that are of most relevance to W2I, and they highlight and discuss conclusions, ideas, and conceptual issues that are salient to the initial RSC consultation and that will inform the questionnaires used during W2I interviews. Based on material discussed in this section, the final section of the report lists potential outstanding literatures that could be addressed by the W2I research team prior to the first RSC meeting and the interview phase of the project.

US Decision Making & Policy on Rwanda & Kosovo

Beyond accounts of the background to the Rwanda and Kosovo conflicts themselves, the most detailed and relevant components of the Jessee and Pilkington literature analyses for W2I pertain to their insights into the dynamics of US decision making and policy vis-à-vis intervention or non-intervention in the two crises. Most relevant to the research and policy objectives of W2I is the comparative consideration of a case in which the US did not intervene to stop what was apprehended as a genocide (Rwanda) with a case in which the US was a forceful leader in a NATO action ostensibly to prevent the escalation of mass killing and displacement of innocents (Kosovo). In brief, US inaction on Rwanda is often attributed to its closeness in time and space to Somalia (and what Somalia did to discourage Americans from risking the lives of US soldiers in another country's internal conflict), the official uncertainty regarding the severity of the threat of genocide, a lack of American security interests in the conflict, lack of public and media pressure for American engagement, and a lack of cultural affinity between the US and people in Africa. US involvement in Kosovo, by contrast, is often explained by making reference to humanitarian values, lessons learned from inaction in Rwanda and from earlier killing in Bosnia (also a knowledge of Milosevic in particular), the fear of escalation in European conflict, and the driving force of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. Whereas failure to act in Rwanda is viewed as a disaster in the humanitarian community and by individual US politicians, the Kosovo intervention was viewed as a debacle by critics of American involvement in humanitarian intervention in general and by those who question the particularities of decision making and policy outcomes in this case. Champions of Kosovo intervention define it as a collective campaign demonstrating the will of international actors to act to protect broadly shared humanitarian values.

As Jessee and Pilkington point out, while there is a fairly solid consensus on the basics of US involvement (or non-involvement) in these two conflicts, much of it is

⁵ Outside of Romeo Dallaire's work, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, an initial literature search produced nothing substantial on the relationship between Canadian decision making and the crisis in Rwanda. This will be addressed below.

⁶ In addition to this overview report, it is recommended that all members of the W2I research team familiarize themselves with the content of all three reports and/or summaries.

journalistic and/or attributable to official autobiographies of prominent leaders and anonymous sources. Goldberg's analysis uncovers literature that considers some of the ways that humanitarian NGOs played a role in influencing US decisions on Kosovo (also on Somalia and Bosnia), but there are no studies that develop and propose practical recommendations on how to influence American decision makers on the basis of a careful comparative understanding and assessment of the handling of these two prominent 1990s cases. The relatively recent emergence of the R2P norm combines with the fact that official US government documents on Rwanda and Kosovo have not been released to make the W2I Project a key component of broader efforts to develop and implement practical policy to ensure that inaction, or poorly conceived and executed actions, from the past will be corrected in the future.

The Jessee and Pilkington reports should be assessed by members of the W2I research team to gain an understanding of the timelines and details of the conflicts and of what is publicly known about US deliberations, decision making, and policy on involvement or non-involvement. The Goldberg documents contribute to W2I's conceptualization of US decision making and policy on Rwanda and Kosovo by teasing out specific conclusions from the Jessee and Pilkington reports on key dynamics and types of events that influenced particular US decision outcomes in these two cases. In the following sub-section, the report presents interim conclusions from the W2I literature analysis on US decision making and policy vis-à-vis Rwanda and Kosovo conducted to date. The sub-section concludes with a summary assessment of the literature analysis on this theme.

Interim Conclusions on US Decision Making & Policy on Rwanda & Kosovo

Interim Conclusion #1: Think Beyond *either* Interests *or* Values *or* Personalities *or* Timing *or* Capacity (American and/or international) as Sole Determinants of US Action or Inaction

A careful reading of the literature shows that all of these factors came into play in different ways in US decision making on whether and when to intervene in Rwanda and Kosovo. This complexity poses a challenge for W2I/R2P advocacy because its efforts have to be ready to grapple with all of the arguments and possibilities that are playing out in any particular case of genocide or mass atrocity crime. Clearly American politicians will *always* say that they are concerned with the loss of life in an R2P situation, but W2I must work towards contending with all of the following: 1) how to push R2P values and practices in the US in response to an emerging crisis when significant clusters of decision makers interpret domestic or international interests as militating against overseas involvement; 2) how to push R2P values and practices in the US in response to an emerging crisis in a timely and effective manner when significant clusters of decision makers are supportive of overseas involvement; 3) how to push R2P values and capacity building in the US during times when it appears as though there is relative global stability. The research team will have to think about the implications of the fact that decision makers will cite multiple factors in justifying their support for or opposition to

intervention in Rwanda and/or Kosovo for W2I interviews and project policy recommendations.

Interim Conclusion #2: Despite Interim Conclusion #1, US Decision Making on Humanitarian Intervention is *Significantly* Influenced by a Relationship Between Contingently Perceived/Shaped Interests and National/Cultural Affinities

While holding strongly to interim conclusion #1, it is hard to study the cases of US involvement in Rwanda and Kosovo and not conclude that US decision makers shaped, and were shaped by, perceptions of US national interests in ways that strongly affected policies on whether or when to intervene. Flowing from perceptions of national interests, it was easier to 'dither' on Rwanda following Somalia (and PDD-25) than it was in relation to Kosovo (given concerns over broader conflict in Europe and the need for the US to be strong in relation to Iraq and Clinton/Lewinsky). Perceived or shaped US national interests interact with national/cultural affinities and familiarities as less affinity helped decision makers insulate US interests from involvement (Rwanda) and greater familiarity is associated with swifter and more aggressive intervention (Kosovo). Applying this to recent events in Darfur, it can be argued that earlier US Christian engagement with South Sudan (religious affinity) helps bring the Bush administration to pay more attention to Darfur than Clinton did to early problems in Rwanda. W2I/R2P advocacy must work towards linking US national interests with acting to prevent genocide against all peoples regardless of timing/culture/geography/history.

Interim Conclusion #3: Non-State Actors (especially humanitarian NGOs) Interacted with US Decision Makers During Rwanda & Kosovo

The literature acknowledges the role of humanitarian NGOs, and individuals associated with the NGO community, in high-level discussions and communications with US decision makers leading up to and during crises in Rwanda and Kosovo. Humanitarian NGOs supplied information about facts on the ground that decision makers chose either to use or not use in their policy making. Government officials (from USAID) with ties to the NGO community sat in on high-level consultation meetings on the crises. If US officials traveled to conflict settings, NGO workers often hosted them and connected them with local communities. While the exact nature of NGO influence and outcomes is debatable, W2I should attempt to investigate more comprehensively NGO (including human rights advocacy organizations) connections to the US government during Rwanda and Kosovo and be optimistic regarding its potential to lay groundwork for many types of R2P advocates to foster productive partnerships with decision makers that push for increased US political will and capacity to intervene in future cases of genocide and mass atrocity crime.

Interim Conclusion #4: From the Perspective of W2I/R2P Advocacy Goals, During the Rwanda and Kosovo Crises, US Decision Makers Employed Humanitarian NGOs to Advance Their Interests More Than Humanitarian NGOs Employed US Decision Makers to Advance Theirs

While humanitarian NGOs were able to supply information from the ground that affected the ways that US decision makers viewed, and made decisions on, intervention in Rwanda and Kosovo, the literature suggests that decision makers relied on this information to support their ultimate decisions rather than to advance policy objectives that a majority of humanitarian workers believed to be necessary to fundamentally help populations at risk. In short, NGOs pleaded for help to 'get the aid through' and, when the US realized it had to do something, NGOs got the response they called for. Though some response may have been better than no response, many NGO workers acknowledged that securing the delivery of humanitarian aid is not the same as intervening to prevent genocide. There are factors internal to the way the NGO community operates that affect the type of advocacy they can launch in relation to crises such as genocide, and W2I's interviews can try to learn more about these details. W2I interviews can also try to explore the NGO-government relationship before and during a crisis in order to ascertain whether different approaches to policy access are available and whether new approaches might lead to both more robust political advocacy and resulting policy options and decisions that are closer to what NGO practitioners would truly like to see.

Interim Conclusion #5: Media Images and Communications (from new and old media) Play A Role in Influencing US Decision Making on Humanitarian Intervention

The literature suggests that when the media displays images of mass killing or refugees, the US public is more inclined to support the idea that the US should do something to help. When the media shows US soldiers being killed, there is less public support for US involvement in humanitarian intervention. The slowness to act in relation to Rwanda coincided with less US media coverage of the conflict prior to the genocide. The rise of a US movement to raise awareness about Darfur coincides with the actions of some prominent journalists and college students to harness the internet to present much more information about conflict in Sudan than was available during Rwanda. Individuals accused of committing violence in Darfur, moreover, use both the internet and traditional media to disseminate messages designed to weaken the resolve of international actors to intervene. In short, measured analysis in the literature does not suggest that intervention directly follows media presentation of suffering, but the implications of media messages and images on international and US decision makers are not to be discounted. W2I can take the employment of both old and new media during conflict into consideration when devising policy tools to support the strengthening of US political will to intervene in cases of genocide and mass atrocity crime.

Summary Assessment of US Decision Making & Policy on Rwanda & Kosovo

In brief, the literature reviewed on US decision making and policy on Rwanda and Kosovo confirms that US decision makers referred both to interests and values when justifying their policies in these cases. In Rwanda, coming closely after Somalia and close to mid-term elections in 1994, most of the reviewed literature suggests that there was a lot of discomfort towards getting involved from the outset and a tremendous hesitation to talk about the possibility that it was genocide. Regarding particular

personalities, some of the literature suggests that Clinton in general was never hungry for a decision on any matter that would have placed images of American troops exposed to violence in front of the American public. There is also discussion of the fact that many of the people involved in the highest level of consultations had little knowledge of the history and issues of the region. Albright, who played a very strong role in pushing for intervention in Kosovo, endorsed the government's position that it could not act when US interests were not at stake. She claimed later that she withheld her true position in support of intervention. In all, the official record on Rwanda suggests that timing, geography, and the political personalities involved allowed domestic political interests (including the economy, health care debates) to be defined as being much more important than the value of humanitarian involvement and these factors enabled the US to withhold commitment to act until it was too late to prevent or reduce the impact of the genocide. In terms of Kosovo, timing and geography were openly cited as important factors by key decision makers in that greater US familiarity and historical connection to Europe combined with geographic and temporal proximity to Bosnia meant to make it more difficult for the US to avoid involvement. Madeleine Albright pushed for strong US involvement in the form of a NATO intervention, and Clinton, after ruling out both non-action and the use of ground troops, bought into Albright's plan for NATO air strikes. Citing Milosevic's previous record, inaction in Rwanda, and fear of a tinderbox in Europe, the US administration openly used both humanitarian values and broader security interests to justify its policy of intervention in the case of Kosovo.

Taking into consideration the multiple factors outlined above, the US decision making process in the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo were quite complex and contingent upon a combination of the way the US government works, the personalities involved, and the timing and location of the conflicts themselves. The media and civil society are non-governmental forces that had an impact on decision making, but not such that outcomes of their influence reflect the policy objectives of W2I/R2P. In preparing thus for the 'concepts' RSC consultation and for the interview phase, the W2I research team must be aware of the narratives of the US roles in Rwanda and Kosovo and, informed by these rich accounts, structure its research efforts to: 1) confirm the veracity of the narratives to the fullest extent possible; 2) determine if policy makers and NGO practitioners believe they could have acted differently than they did in relation to Rwanda and Kosovo given the time periods and constraints under which they worked; and 3) ascertain what policy makers and NGO practitioners can take from their experiences with decision making vis-à-vis humanitarian intervention in the 1990s to apply to policy and practical advice for those pushing the US government to develop the political will to intervene in humanitarian crises in a post-9/11, post-Iraq, R2P, Darfur world.⁷

Civil Society Advocacy

A large portion of the W2I fall, 2007 literature analysis was conducted to assess recent literature on civil society policy advocacy. This component of the W2I literature analysis aimed to consider general accounts of policy advocacy, studies of advocacy in

⁷ These broad objectives are reflected in the questions proposed in the report's section on preliminary potential interview questions.

relation to Rwanda/Kosovo/Darfur, as well as studies of particular analogous cases of advocacy for government intervention in the areas of human rights and the environment. As W2I/R2P advocacy aims to take a relatively newly developed international norm on state sovereignty and intervention in cases of genocide/mass atrocity crime and push for governments to engage practices and build capacities to act according to this norm, the fall literature analysis reviewed contributions in the area of normative international relations and global civil society. Theoretical and applied literature in these areas are especially concerned with ways that local advocates coordinate political mobilization with international coalitions of NGOs and social movements to pressure individual states or economic institutions to change its policies and practices. This body of literature often covers global advocacy campaigns in the areas of human rights and environmental intervention. Finally, a smaller sub-section of the civil society advocacy literature analysis focuses specifically on policy advocacy in Canada and the US. One source in particular (Sussman 2007)⁸ is especially relevant and insightful regarding contemporary policy advocacy in Canada and should be read thoroughly by members of the W2I research team.

Recent accounts of civil society advocacy in a global context outline a dual reality in which newer manifestations of non-state actor coalitions calling for altered state policies are counterbalanced by the ability of individual states to endorse progressive norms while maintaining previous policy practices. Balanced empirical and theoretical accounts of normative international relations and global civil society caution thus that advocacy to implement even a widely accepted international political norm (such as R2P) requires long-term and well-organized efforts. Thinking about the relationship between civil society advocacy across a number of issue areas and the research and policy objectives of W2I, Goldberg identified several interim conclusions from the literature reviewed in fall, 2007. Following the interim conclusions, this sub-section will conclude with a summary assessment of the literature reviewed on civil society advocacy.

Interim Conclusions on Civil Society Advocacy

Interim Conclusion #1: Political Advocacy is a Long-Term Project Executed by Diverse Constituencies

To get governments to change a policy or uphold an existing policy commitment, advocates must be prepared to commit to long-term efforts to achieve their goals. It takes a lot of time and effort to determine a policy objective, to figure out which levels of decision making are responsible for making and enacting desired policies, determining and executing advocacy tactics, and securing ongoing relationships with political actors who are needed by advocates to achieve policy goals. Advocacy campaigns are not about voting or influencing elections alone and they succeed when advocates can demonstrate to decision makers that they represent the desires and experiences of diverse constituencies of citizens. In light of these general insights, based on findings from interviews with top decision makers and NGO practitioners, W2I should work towards

⁸ The full reference is: Sussman, Amanda. 2007. *The Art of the Possible (a handbook for political activism)*. Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Stewart. MIGS holds a copy of this work.

developing strategic recommendations for, and long term relationships with, the different North American constituencies that are executing campaigns and actions to promote R2P. This includes activists, scholars, media, faith communities, politicians, and the NGO community. Relevant to the W2I interview phase, discussions with NGO practitioners who were involved with Rwanda and Kosovo should explore their views on what can be done in the future to ensure that divisions that have previously prevented joint advocacy by humanitarian and human rights constituencies can be challenged and overcome.

Interim Conclusion #2: Political Advocacy is About Helping Decision Makers Solve Problems

Decision makers in democracies need citizens, and groups representing citizens, to help them advance their policies. Decision makers need the public for political support but also to learn about social problems and to consult over potential solutions for social problems. In light of this understanding of an interconnected relationship between decision makers and citizens, advocates can do their best by playing the role of being experts and consultants to government as it creates and/or modifies its official policies. In practical terms, this means the following for advocacy: 1) advocates have to be aware of the ways the government works in order to put themselves into relationships with government decision makers; 2) advocacy, while at times requiring confrontational tactics and ideas, must be motivated by strategies and actions to create alliances with decision makers in order to effect reform and change in government policy; 3) advocates must set specific realistic goals for themselves that can be achieved by decision makers and measured in terms of their achievement; 4) pitching themselves as resources to decision makers, advocates must see beyond party and ideological divisions and aim to achieve broad government and decision maker understanding of, and support for, their particular policy goals and objectives. In light of this, W2I advocacy recommendations have to be more specific than 'ending genocide' or promoting the domestic 'political will to intervene.' W2I recommendations must support advocacy in pursuit of a diverse array of specific US and Canadian policy actions that, in their totality, will contribute to achieving broader overall R2P goals. W2I will have to help forge connections between R2P advocates and politicians of all political stripes to ensure that broad decision maker consensus exists on the need to intervene to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocity crimes. Relevant to the W2I interview phase, discussions with NGO practitioners who were involved with Rwanda and Kosovo should explore their views on previous relationships between advocates, other non-government constituents, and the government. Would NGO practitioners *and* government respondents agree or disagree with the suggestion that, even in the post-9/11 climate where 'security' is the highest policy concern in North America, more can be done in the future to forge relationships between R2P advocates and *all* government political actors? If so, what specific pathways of interaction and relationship-building can be suggested by government respondents? Is this vision of an ongoing relationship to shape policy in an incremental fashion acceptable to non-state actor respondents within the North American R2P constituencies?

Interim Conclusion #3: Political Advocacy Requires Engagement with both Political Processes and Problems and Bureaucratic Processes and Problems

Because the officials who run the bureaucracy can have great control over how and whether any policy decision can be implemented, advocates have to address both political policy processes, problems, and challenges (called top-down policy making in the context of government) and bureaucratic policy processes, problems, and challenges (called bottom-up policy making in the context of government). It is not enough to get a political decision maker to agree to a new policy direction, it also has to be signed off by those who know the potentials and limitations of resources in bureaucratic departments that administer or execute government policy. Advocates must get to know those who work in bureaucracy to understand the way policy making and changing looks from their perspective. They must be aware of inter and intra-departmental bureaucratic conflicts and competitions that could render potential change in one department subject to criticism and resistance from those who operate another department or that could result in a higher-level member of a single department quash the policy making initiative shown by a lower member of the same department. In terms of political problems, advocates have to work on bridging gaps between competing political parties to ensure that enough of an internal consensus can be built to push through new or modified policy directions. In practical terms for W2I, interviews with politicians in the US and Canada should be informed by knowledge of the interrelationship between politics and bureaucracy in the two political systems. It should also aim to examine information and power flow between the political and bureaucratic sectors of government to determine how the interrelationship between the two sectors influenced decisions and actions on intervention or non-intervention in Rwanda and Kosovo. Mapping this out will necessarily help with designing policy suggestions for supportive politicians and with developing recommendations for R2P advocacy that intends to reach and influence key government decision makers.

Interim Conclusion #4: W2I Must Work to Define its Strategic Niche in Global 'Bottom-Up' Advocacy Coalitions Working to Advance and Consolidate R2P Policy That was Originally Conceived 'Top-Down'

R2P can be seen as an elite-driven policy process resulting in a new set of principles and values to guide international political practice in relation to international relations, humanitarian intervention, sovereignty, and genocide and mass atrocity crimes. Top-down policy making in this sense can stir constituencies of global citizens who either agree or disagree with the new idea and who become active to advance or oppose it. As stated above, there already exists diverse groups of actors working to promote and advance aspects of R2P. By gaining insight from high-level political 'consultants' who were engaged with Rwanda and Kosovo decision-making, W2I will be in an excellent position to ally with other advocates, and to supply them with strategic resources of many kinds, in the common pursuit of translating a new policy value into actual political capacities and actions. As the project develops, the W2I research team must be constantly working on identifying, sharpening, and publicizing its particular strategic

objectives and identity while at the same time not losing sight of its interconnectedness with a broader R2P advocacy constituency.

Interim Conclusion #5: Even in the Age of Globalization, Effective Political Advocacy Doesn't Sacrifice the Local for the Global

Despite the rise in global advocacy coalitions that use international norms and diverse tactics to target domestic states for policy reform in areas such as human rights and the environment, the literature suggests that the most successful transnational campaigns are associated with the presence of all of the following: 1) a strong domestic movement that is engaged with the local political system, society, and elites; 2) international advocate allies (including NGOs, social movements, intergovernmental organizations, and other state governments); and 3) international norms that resonate, or that can be harmonized, with local political, cultural, and historical realities. The most salient practical lesson to draw from this is that while it might be tempting to draw international partners into shaming the US or Canada into intervening in cases of genocide or mass atrocity crimes, this strategy is not likely to succeed in the absence of well-organized domestic advocacy campaigns that are forging connections with government decision makers that are supportive of W2I/R2P goals. International norms and organizations are excellent resources for consciousness raising or political education but local advocacy engagement is needed to exact leverage for R2P related policy reform in the US and Canadian governments. In light of these insights, W2I advocacy recommendations and outputs should be directed locally while thinking globally.

Summary Assessment of Civil Society Advocacy

In short, the fall, 2007 literature review suggests that, even with a widely supportable goal (such as an internationally endorsed norm such as R2P), successful policy advocacy requires much planning, coordination, knowledge of political and bureaucratic systems, knowledge of the issues, knowledge of the positions of both government and civil society allies and opponents, broad and enduring alliances, clear and measurable goals, and an approach that engages with decision makers in efforts to help them solve problems. Policy advocacy in democratic political systems is necessarily about working to achieve incremental changes and about finding ways to cultivate ongoing relationships between those outside of the government (the advocates) and those on the inside who can take particular actions in pursuit of broader policy goals. Both advocates and decision makers must feel as though they are gaining something from the implementation of new policies and successful advocates think about the political and bureaucratic needs of politicians with whom they are working in addition to their own larger goals.

These suggestions on successful policy advocacy are thought-provoking to W2I's research and policy objectives in particular and to R2P advocacy in general. From this perspective, successful advocacy may share things in common with consciousness-raising and/or political education but goes far beyond these goals in terms of its systematic efforts to forge and maintain ongoing interaction and exchange between non-state and

state actors. To take current advocacy efforts vis-à-vis Darfur into consideration to illustrate this distinction, recent literature suggests that while R2P is much more widely known in the current time period, and while the US in particular has seen the rise of a vigorous movement to raise awareness of the situation in Sudan (demonstrations, petitions, films, op-eds), advocacy efforts have not yet succeeded in pushing the US government to act on its own, or to work through the UN, to aggressively take the measures required to reduce the killing of innocents. In short, though it clearly qualifies as an R2P situation, efforts in the US that have brought many constituencies (including members of the US Congress) to gain new *understandings* of, and activist/advocacy orientations towards, what is going on in Darfur have not managed to help push the US government to summon the political will to act forcefully to prevent and reduce mass killing. While one of the oft-cited reasons for US failure to act more forcefully in Darfur emerges from concerns that the current administration cannot reconcile humanitarian intervention with its focus on security and international terror in the post-9/11 climate, the literature on successful political advocacy would endorse ongoing advocacy efforts to promote R2P among *all* parties in the American (and Canadian) political system with strategies to demonstrate why intervening in Darfur will serve the overall security and value interests of the US. The reviewed literature argues that, to achieve political change, the best approach to advocacy tries to find common ground with the political establishment as a whole. This notion might fly in the face of W2I/R2P advocates who cannot imagine engaging the Republicans (or the Conservative Party in Canada) on matters of humanitarian intervention. In the very least, the lessons of the literature reviewed in fall, 2007 will have to be given careful consideration by the W2I research team as it decides the best approach to take to advance its policy objectives.

In sum, as W2I develops, the research team will want to think about the approach it wants to take towards advocacy and this will have a bearing on both the interview and policy output and recommendation stages of the project. The interim conclusions from this component of W2I's literature analysis can thus be used by the research team as a foundation for: 1) thinking about how to ask questions about, and assess the role of, NGOs in attempting to influence the US and Canadian governments during Rwanda and Kosovo; 2) thinking about how to ask questions to government decision makers in the US and Canada on their perspectives of the best ways that policy advocates can cultivate effective relationships and strategies with the state on R2P issues in the future; and 3) developing W2I's final policy recommendations and outputs for different W2I/R2P advocacy constituencies.

Canadian Policy and Decision Making on Humanitarian Intervention

Although W2I will focus on US and Canadian decision making experiences vis-à-vis Rwanda and Kosovo to develop policy and advocacy recommendations to help both countries summon the political will to intervene in future cases of genocide and mass atrocity crime, the state of the project's current awareness of Canadian experience with R2P situations in general and Canadian policy in relation to Rwanda and Kosovo in particular is quite lacking. While the Jessee and Pilkington reports touch on the basics of Canadian involvement in Rwanda and Kosovo, and while Goldberg conducted a

preliminary literature analysis of Canadian policy on humanitarian intervention and Kosovo⁹, the literature in these areas requires immediate additional attention by the W2I research team to fill current gaps. ✓

Because the consulted literature on this topic is not deep, this sub-section will not present interim conclusions. Instead, the following sub-section will list a series of interrelated preliminary assumptions, with brief discussions of the ideas and questions informing these assumptions, that emerges from the literature that has been analyzed and that is listed in Appendix B below. These assumptions form a good starting point from which the new W2I research team can more comprehensively tackle the question of Canadian policy and decision making on humanitarian intervention in general and with respect to Rwanda and Kosovo in particular.

Preliminary Ideas and Questions on Canadian Policy and Decision Making on Humanitarian Intervention (Including Consideration of Canada's Involvement in Kosovo)¹⁰

Preliminary Assumption #1: Canada's reputation, and past policies, as a peacekeeper significantly affects political/policy and scholarly debates over Canada's role in humanitarian intervention and R2P situations.

The small amount of literature consulted so far addresses numerous questions surrounding this assumption: Has Canada truly been *only* a peacekeeper in the past? Does Canada have the military capacity to be more than just a peacekeeper? Given Canada's reputation as a peacekeeper, should it not be much more careful than it has been in joining international actions, including Kosovo, whose ends may not match the values used to justify them? In posing some answers to these questions, the literature is split on whether Canada, in recent cases like Kosovo and Iraq, really does what is best for international peace and security as defined by traditional Canadian values or comes too close to following the policies of the US. ← a Can. plus for polit. leaders

Preliminary Assumption #2: Canada's record and policy on humanitarian intervention and international security are historically inconsistent.

The previous assumption is closely related, ^{to} this one which suggests that due to the fact that it comes under the auspices of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and CIDA, but has also been shaped by individual prime ministers and cabinet ministers, Canadian policy on humanitarian intervention and international security has reflected no clear line of consistent development. Scholars writing on these subjects tends to support the notion that Canada waffles between actions that reflect the values of multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution and ad hoc decisions to bolster Canada's reputation and/or relationship vis-à-vis the US. ✓

⁹ See Appendix B for the bibliography of the works studied in Goldberg's fall, 2007 literature review. Note that this appendix contains a short section of key works that Goldberg identified but did not read.

¹⁰ As stated in note #5, very little material on Canada's decision making vis-à-vis Rwanda has been considered by W2I to date.

Preliminary Assumption #3: Assumptions # 1 & # 2 relate to the debate about what is meant by the 'human security' doctrine and how it was applied to Canadian involvement in the NATO campaign in Kosovo.

by / X
Lloyd Axworthy is linked to a shift towards a 'human security' paradigm in Canadian foreign policy, but there is very little clarity in the literature reviewed thus far on what this means. The Axworthy doctrine, depending on which analysis is read, either stands for humanitarianism in foreign policy par excellence or for an effort to revive the Canadian armed forces in a way that leans more towards militarism and US-defined security concerns than traditionally defined Canadian concerns with peacekeeping and development. This debate is clearly demonstrated ~~by~~ Canada's involvement with the air campaign in Kosovo in that many decision makers and scholars view Canada's participation as a clear expression of progressive humanitarian intervention while others condemn it for causing greater damage to the well-being and security of ordinary Serbians and Kosovo Albanians than before the NATO action.

Preliminary Assumption #4: Canada's status as a *middle power*, with geographic and cultural proximity to the US, contributes to various ambivalences and inconsistencies in foreign policy.

From the very outset of planning for W2I, contributors to the project were interested in the question of what, if anything, can middle powers do vis-à-vis R2P situations and to encourage and help great powers act to prevent genocide and mass atrocity crime. While assumption #4 is not explicitly expressed in the small sample of literature reviewed in fall, 2007, it is implicit to many accounts. Canada has different capacities to act in global political affairs than does the US and this has likely pushed certain Canadian decision makers to emphasize value and policy distinction from the US and led others to advocate for greater policy convergence. What are the implications of this reality for W2I/R2P in a post-9/11/Iraq/Darfur international context? This consideration could be explored in further W2I literature analysis and also pondered in greater detail by the research team as it prepares to interview Canadian decision makers. Sensitivity to the specific role of the middle power will likely structure W2I policy recommendations and outputs developed for advocate constituencies in both Canada and the US.

In sum, from the small sample of literature analyzed thus far, scholarly positions on Canadian involvement in international security and humanitarian interventions appear to reflect some of the historical inconsistencies of Canadian policy itself. More work is needed to flesh out this, and other relevant findings (especially that pertaining to Canadian policy in Rwanda), and specific recommendations on this are made in the report's final section below.

Question Emerging from 3 January W2I Project Meeting

Question #1: Can the W2I Project investigate the different approaches that advisers from Quebec and English Canada took towards Canadian government decision making on Rwanda/Kosovo?

At the W2I project meeting on January 3, 2008, RD suggested that there may have been a significant number of Quebec advisers to the federal government with a particular intellectual analysis of Rwanda (sympathetic to the Hutus) that influenced the Canadian government to refrain from intervening to quell the violence and genocide. Is the Quebec-Canada nexus in the Canadian government a structural characteristic of politics in Canada that has a decisive impact on the direction of policy making on R2P situations? W2I literature analysis and interviews can test our this proposition. If it can demonstrate that the Quebec-Canada historic interrelationship affects Canadian policy and decision making in the area of humanitarian intervention, this is a major factor that will have to be taken into consideration in designing policy tools and recommendations for Canada.

Conclusion

The W2I literature analysis to date contains rich insights from scholarly and secondary sources on US decision making in Rwanda and Kosovo and from recent accounts of civil society advocacy in a global political context. It contains more limited, but important foundational, findings on the literature on Canadian policy and decision making on humanitarian intervention and on Canada's involvement in Rwanda and Kosovo. This section has presented an overview of the reviewed literature's findings, interim conclusions, and themes that are highly relevant to the next phases of W2I. It has suggested ways that this information is important to both the research and policy objectives of the project. It has also suggested a few thematic areas for which more literature analysis is needed by the W2I research team. This final item is addressed in greater detail in the report's final section on W2I strategic recommendations.

Preliminary Potential Interviewees

The Jessee and Pilkington reports contain exhaustive lists of potential W2I Canadian and American interviewees, organized according to country of conflict. The fall, 2007 literature review uncovered additional names of potential respondents from both Canada and the US and this section presents a combined listing of all potential respondents suggested by W2I contributors to date.

The section is organized primarily according to country being studied (US and Canada). Each sub-section (Rwanda or Kosovo) is further organized according to government and/or military decision makers and NGO advocates/practitioners. Where relevant, each sub-section also contains lists of scholars, journalists, or former public servants with professional expertise in the area of humanitarian intervention and/or international politics and security.

United States

Rwanda

Government & Military Decision Makers

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| • Bill Clinton | President |
| • Richard Clarke | Special assistant to the president (PDD-25) |
| • Warren Christopher | Secretary of State 1993-1997 |
| • Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. | Deputy Secretary of State until 1994 |
| • Strobe Talbot | Deputy Secretary of State 1994-1997 |
| • Frank Wisner | Under Secretary |
| • Prudence Bushnell | Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs |
| • Michael McCurry | State Department spokesperson |
| • David P. Rawson | US Ambassador to Rwanda |
| • J. Brian Atwood | Special representative to Rwanda |
| • Anthony Lake | National Security Advisor |
| • Sandy Berger | Deputy National Security Advisor |
| • David Scheffer | Sat on Deputies Committee, NSA |
| • Les Aspin | Defense Secretary 1993-1994 |
| • William J. Perry | Defense Secretary 1994-1997 |
| • John Deutsch | Deputy Defense Secretary 1994-1995 |
| • Madeleine Albright | Ambassador to UN |
| • Janet Reno | Attorney General |
| • Tony Marley | US military liaison to Arusha process |
| • Tim Wirth | State Department Undersecretary for Global Affairs |
| • Paul Simon | Congressional supporter of US military involvement |
| • Jim Jeffords | Congressional supporter of US military involvement |
| • Tony Hall | Congressional supporter of UNAMIR II |
| • Donald Payne | Congressional supporter of UNAMIR II |

NGO Actors, Journalists, Scholars

- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| • Alison Des Forges | Historian, Board member, Human Rights Watch |
| • Linda Melvern (UK) | Investigative journalist/author |
| • Samantha Power | War correspondent/author |
| • Eugene Dewey | Capitol Hill Hunger Consortium (lobbied NSC to respond to Rwanda crisis) |
| • Julian Taft | Headed humanitarian NGO consortium |
| • Jean de Courten | Interaction and government lobbying |
| • Laurence Binet | International Committee for the Red Cross |
| | International Committee for the Red Cross |

NGO/Government Actors with Prior Humanitarian Advocacy Experience in US (e.g. Somalia)¹¹

Roger Winter, US Comm on Refugees (RW)

- Jan Westcott Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) coordinator for Somalia in DC
- Andrew Natsios USAID (Lots of views on NGO role in Somalia)
- Philip Johnston CARE (Testified in DC on need for intervention, lobbying)
- Peter Bell CARE (Testified in DC on need for intervention, lobbying)
- Kevin Henry CARE
- Alex Watson Deputy Chief of US Mission to UN (Call for UN intervention)
- Jan Eliasson UN Dept. of Humanitarian Affairs (Call for UN intervention)

Kosovo

Government Decision Makers

- Bill Clinton President
- Al Gore Vice President
- Madeleine Albright Secretary of State
- Strobe Talbott Deputy Secretary of State
- Morton Halperin Director of Policy Planning, State
- James Rubin State Department spokesperson
- Jim O'Brien Official, State
- William Walker Head of KVM
- Richard Holbrooke US envoy
- Chris Hill US Ambassador to Macedonia
- Richard Miles US Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade
- Sandy Berger National Security Advisor
- James Steinberg Deputy National Security Advisor
- William Cohen Defense Secretary
- John Hamre Deputy Defense Secretary
- Janet Reno Attorney General
- George Tenet DCI
- Henry Shelton Chairman, JCS
- Wesley Clark Commander of Operation Allied Force
- Henry Kissinger Ex-National Security Advisor and Secretary of State

¹¹ Many of the following individuals may have played a role in Rwanda advocacy and/or are still active in the humanitarian NGO community. If not directly involved with Rwanda they are likely to have knowledge of the crisis and be connected to those NGO practitioners who were involved.

• Alphonse D'amato (R)	Congressional champion of intervention
• Bob Dole (R)	Congressional champion of intervention
• Elliot Engle (D)	Congressional champion of intervention
• Joe Biden (D)	Congressional champion of intervention
• Lincoln Diaz-Balart	Congressional champion of intervention
• Chet Edwards	Congressional champion of intervention
• Sam Gejdenson	Congressional champion of intervention
• David Obey	Congressional champion of intervention
• Chris Dodd	Congressional champion of intervention
• Richard Durban	Congressional champion of intervention
• Mary Landrieu	Congressional champion of intervention
• Mark Sanford	Congressional opponent of intervention
• William Goodling	Congressional opponent of intervention
• Jim Leach	Congressional opponent of intervention
• Jerry Costello	Congressional opponent of intervention
• Lindsey Graham	Congressional opponent of intervention
• Max Cleland	Congressional opponent of intervention
• Kevin Brady	Congress debates, complex position ¹²
• Robert Smith	Congress debates, complex position
• Kay Bailey Hutchison	Congress debates, complex position
• John McCain	Congress debates, complex position
• John Kerry	Congress debates, complex position
• H. Roy Williams	Head of OFDA
• Julian Taft	Head of humanitarian wing of State Dept., Bureau of Refugees, Population, and Migration (PRM), attended monthly meetings with State, OFDA, and NGO Consortium

NGO Actors and Journalists

• Alan Ross	Doctors of the World (go-between for humanitarian NGOs and and US government) ¹³
• Samantha Power	Professor, Harvard
• Barton Gellman	Journalist, Washington Post
• Elaine Sciolino	Journalist, New York Times
• Ethan Bronner	Journalist, New York Times

¹² Congressional leaders with the designation 'Congress debates, complex position' were usually supportive of intervention, but stressed the importance of acting more forcefully and decisively than in previous US engagements.

¹³ Additional humanitarian NGOs involved in Kosovo prior to the NATO campaign were Catholic Relief Services and Mercy Corps International.

Canada

Rwanda

Government and Military Decision Makers

- Jean Chretien Prime Minister
- Andre Ouellet Minister of Foreign Affairs
- David Collenette Minister of National Defense
- General John de Chastelain Chief of Defence Staff
- Ambassador Jim Wall Canadian Ambassador to Rwanda
- Lucie Edwards High Commissioner to Kenya
- Louise Frechette Canadian Ambassador to the UN
- General Maurice Baril Head of the Military Division, DPKO
- General Romeo Dallaire Force Commander of UNAMIR
- Brent Beardsley Assistant to Romeo Dallaire
- Eddie Goldenberg Adviser to Jean Chretien
- Jean Pelletier Chief of Staff to Jean Chretien
- Bob Fowler Former Deputy Minister of National Defence (1989) and Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UN

Kosovo

Government and Military Decision Makers

- Jean Chrétien Prime Minister
- Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Art Eggleton Minister of National Defence
- Anne McLellan Attorney General
- Maurice Baril Chief of Defence Staff
- James Bissett Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia
- Lewis Mackenzie Retired Major General, appointed to UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia, 1990, opposed to NATO campaign
- General John A. MacInnis Commander Canadian Contingent of UN Forces in former Yugoslavia (1993)

Scholars, Former Canadian Government Policy Advisors, and Decision Makers

- Edward McWhinney Former advisor to External Affairs
- Elizabeth Paddon Research conducted in the area of UN peacekeeping
- Louis Delvoie Former Assistant Deputy Minister in Dept. of National Defense, Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations at Queen's

- Alex Morrison Director of Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, former military advisor to Canadian mission to UN in NYC
- Allan Gotlieb Former Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, author of numerous books and articles on international politics
- Michael Byers CRC in International Law and Politics at UBC, scholar of Canada's role in international politics
- James Bartleman Canadian Ambassador to NATO, 1990-1994
- Janice Gross Stein Scholar of Canadian foreign policy, Munk Centre, U. of T.
- Eugene Lang Author and former Chief of Staff for two Liberal Ministers of Defence
- Michael Ignatieff Ex-Professor, Harvard, current Liberal MP

Can Journalists?

Preliminary Potential Interview Questions

The questions presented in this section are derived from the Jessee and Pilkington literature analysis reports and from the fall, 2007 literature analysis. The W2I research team can use this list as a basis from which to develop question guides for the project's interview phase. The section is divided into the following sub-sections: general questions, questions on Rwanda, questions on Kosovo, and questions to NGO practitioners/advocates.

General Questions

- What are some of the logistical concerns facing policy makers regarding humanitarian intervention?
- From the perspective of Canada and the US, can the UN be partner in R2P interventions? Why or why not?
- From the perspective of Canada and the US, how can diplomatic solutions to international conflicts be pursued?
- Does Canada/US have credibility as an honest broker in pursuing diplomatic and/or peacekeeping operations? Why or why not?
- To what extent does the reputation or perceived character of the individuals leading humanitarian interventions affect the perception and potential outcomes of the intervention? To what extent does it affect the US/Canada's willingness to cooperate or participate in a mission led by other countries?
- In making decisions on whether or not to intervene overseas militarily for humanitarian reasons, how important is it for the top advisers and decision makers to have a specialized knowledge of the history and conditions of the region of crisis in question? Is there a relationship between the historical/cultural/political closeness or distance between an intervening government and a region/country in crisis and the decision to intervene or to avoid intervention?
- Do NGOs or other non-governmental actors influence Canadian/US foreign policy? Is this desirable to government actors? How can partnerships be best

forged between state and non-state actors seeking to constructively influence foreign policy on R2P issues?

- How does public opinion shape the development of US/Canadian foreign policy? At what point, or under what circumstances, if any, is public opinion taken into account by decision makers?
- What are the different organizations/departments in the US/Canadian governments that have a role in determining foreign policy decisions in humanitarian intervention situations? What are their historical perspectives and policies towards overseas military involvement for humanitarian reasons?
- What is the previous impact of PDD-25 on US foreign policy in R2P situations? What is the impact of PDD-25 on future US foreign policy decisions in R2P situations?
- In Canada, what is meant by 'human security'? How does this differ from previous Canadian foreign policy principles? How has this concept shaped foreign policy since Kosovo? How is it interpreted differently by different actors within the Canadian government and military?
- In a post-9/11/Iraq/Darfur world, can US/Canada help reconcile R2P with legitimate concerns with international and North American security?

Rwanda

- How accurate is the public record in its understanding of the Canadian and US foreign policy decision making processes?
- How would you characterize the political atmosphere regarding intervention prior to the Rwandan civil war? After the Rwandan genocide?
- Who led the decision making processes? How would you classify it in terms of top-down or bottom-up?
- Can you identify and weigh the various factors that contributed to the US/Canada's decision to abstain from intervention?
- In the US, would it have made a difference to have top decision makers involved with more expertise with Rwanda and the local history and conflicts?
- How early did decision makers realize that a genocide was occurring? What was the impact of media reporting on genocide in Rwanda and Canadian/US actions and decision making?
- How was Canadian/US inaction on Rwanda justified by various decision makers before the genocide started? After the genocide started? What factors contributed to these justifications?
- Why did humanitarian reports and values not provide enough motivation for political intervention to stop the killing of innocents?
- What was the relationship between Somalia and Canada/US government inaction in Rwanda?
- How was UNAMIR perceived by the US/Canadian government? What were its strengths and weaknesses?
- To what extent were the activities of UNAMIR being monitored by the US/Canadian governments?

- How might UNAMIR have been designed differently, given the exact same conditions and time period, to gain support of the US/Canadian governments?
- During the genocide, why didn't the US station troops in Burundi to assist UNAMIR? *Did to protect lives of Amers*
- What were internal US/Canadian government reactions to R. Dallaire's initial reports that violence was escalating? Why did the US/Canadian government not put pressure on the UN to support raids of the weapons caches identified by informant Jean-Pierre? *Somalia*
- Was there contact between the US/Canadian government and Paul Kagame or the RPF prior to or during the genocide? If so, what was the nature of this contact?
- Was the US/Canadian government following French involvement in Rwanda surrounding the genocide? If so, what did you understand to be the nature of this involvement? Did this knowledge affect US/Canadian government's decision to avoid intervention?
- In the Canadian context, how accurate is the R. Dallaire claim of the turf war between National Defense (supporting troop deployment) and Foreign Affairs (wanted to avoid costs of 'yet another' peacekeeping mission? What other reasons were taken into consideration and by whom?
- In the Canadian context, were there competing Quebec and English Canadian schools of thought on what was happening in Rwanda that affected Canadian government decision making?
- Had there been more humanitarian NGOS on the ground in Rwanda leading up to the genocide, communicating and sending information to Washington/Ottawa, is there a greater likelihood that there would have been an intervention?
- Could options or ideas for intervention been presented differently to make the possibility more attractive/practical for US/Canadian decision makers?
- Was the lack of intervention by Canada/US more of a political decision of bureaucratic decision? Explain?
- What do you believe to be the effect in Canada/US/world to nonintervention in Rwanda?
- Are there key documents or people you can direct us to in order to improve our understanding of US/Canadian decision making process in Rwanda?
- Can you imagine the existence of an R2P norm making a difference in the case of Rwanda if it had existed at the time? If so, how would you assess current US/Canadian policy on Darfur?
- For Warren Christopher: What happened between May 21 and June 10 to allow the State Department accept the term genocide in reference to Rwanda?
- For Madeleine Albright: One what grounds did you vote in favour of Operation Turquoise? Is it true that your personal view was to support intervention but that, as the Ambassador the UN, you elected to accept the administration's position? If so, could you imagine being in the same post in the same time and something happening to allow you to oppose administration policy?
- For Bill Clinton: How do you respond to the assertion that one of your constant basic domestic political concerns was to avoid having US troops involved in

combat that would be viewed by American citizens? If there is truth to this view, how do you weigh it in relation to other systemic or broader political factors (Somalia, PDD-25, health care issues, the economy) that may have encouraged you to rule out intervention in Rwanda? To what extent were you aware of the atrocities in Rwanda as the genocide progressed? What was responsible for keeping you informed? What was the nature of your communication with them during the genocide? To what extent did public opinion (the lack of overwhelming public attention in this case) influence your decision not to intervene? What were other contributing factors? Can NGOs and other non-state actors play an ongoing role in helping the US government respond to R2P situations? If so, how? If you personally had decided it would have been the best course of action to intervene, could you have made it happen? Today, how do you view your decision not to intervene in Rwanda? What lessons can you take from Rwanda to apply to support those who advocate for the putting the norm of R2P into practice in a post-9/11/Iraq/Darfur world?

- For Clinton advisers/aids/close associates: To what extent was Clinton aware of the escalation of violence in Rwanda during the civil war? To what extent was he informed of the successes and failures of UNAMIR? When did he learn that the atrocities had progressed to genocide? Who was responsible for informing him? How did he respond? From your vantage point, was decision making top-down or bottom-up?
- For Jean Chretien: To what extent were you aware of the atrocities in Rwanda as the genocide progressed? What was responsible for keeping you informed? What was the nature of your communication with them during the genocide? To what extent did public opinion influence your decision not to intervene? What were other contributing factors? Can NGOs and other non-state actors play an ongoing role in helping the Canadian government respond to R2P situations? If so, how? In light of Canada's sponsorship of R2P, how do you view your decision not to intervene in Rwanda? What is your response to the fact that a Canadian commander (Dallaire) called for an international action to prevent genocide and the government did not aggressively support him? Could Canada have taken bold moves to act on genocide in Rwanda if the US did not? What lessons can you take from Rwanda to apply to support those who advocate for the putting the norm of R2P into practice in a post-9/11/Iraq/Darfur world?
- For Chretien advisers/aids/close associates: To what extent was Chretien aware of the escalation of violence in Rwanda during the civil war? To what extent was he informed of the successes and failures of UNAMIR? When did he learn that the atrocities had progressed to genocide? Who was responsible for informing him? How did he respond? From your vantage point, was decision making top-down or bottom-up?
- For General/Senator Dallaire: In hindsight, how might you appeal differently to the international community, particularly the US and Canadian governments, to encourage intervention? Who would you approach for assistance in this endeavour? What recommendations do you have for UN-led interventions? What do you know about developing the political will to stop genocide today that you did not know in 1994?

Kosovo

United States

- How accurate is the outline description of the public account of US decision-making process provided?
- In what ways is it inaccurate?
- What further information or clarification do you wish to add?
- Did Albright lead the decision-making process, as opposed to Clinton?
- How much, and in what ways, was Clinton involved?
- Was Clinton distracted by the Lewinsky scandal/impeachment? Saddam Hussein?
- What drove Albright in her beliefs over Milosevic?
- If Albright had not championed the cause, would the US have intervened?
- Do campaigns for humanitarian intervention require tenacious champions at the highest level? Without such champions, does the executive normally exhibit too much inertia to act? Even without a top cabinet member as champion of intervention, could strong support within Congress lead the executive to act in an R2P situation?
- Why did Albright win the day against reluctant parties such as Berger, Cohen, and Shelton? What were the latter's concerns? Did the administration/cabinet/Contact Group consider the argument that a NATO air campaign, as it was being conceived, would do more harm than good?
- Ultimately, who was for it, and why? Who was against it, and why?
- Which actors/positions had the greatest influence in the advocacy and decision-making processes?
- What other policy options were discussed, and why were these not favored?
- How crucial was the Racak massacre in changing the minds of those against intervention?
- Did Albright ultimately need/await a galvanizing PR event/evidence to justify intervention to the decision-makers and/or the US public? Did Albright act to reverse her decision to oppose intervention in Rwanda? Did Albright act to give a revitalized NATO (something of which she was also a strong champion) a mission?
- Do the following three official motives for action suggested by the Administration accurately reflect its reasons for acting?
 - Promote regional stability, including the investment in Bosnia
 - Prevent humanitarian crisis in Kosovo
 - Preserve US and NATO credibility.
- Clinton's autobiography focuses on the humanitarian justification of the mission. Does this reflect his true thinking at the time, the supplementary justifications being given to satisfy the American public, or is Clinton, through his memoirs,

simply trying to ensure that his actions are reflected more favorably in the light of history?

- What other motives for action were there?
 - What weighting was given to these motives in the decision-making process?
 - What were the motives for inaction?
 - What role, if any, was played by public opinion/media in deciding to plan a NATO air mission?
 - What role, if any, was played by humanitarian NGOs and human rights NGOs/organizations in US decision making on intervention in Kosovo?
 - What weighting was given to these motives in the decision-making process?
 - What criteria were used in decision-making (e.g. cost-benefit analysis)?
 - If a cost-benefit model was used, how were human costs taken into account?
 - How can the value of human life be given greater weight in the decision-making process?
 - How can the decision-making process be expedited or improved?
-
- Did the decision-makers recognize the illegality of NATO's actions under international law? How did they weigh the urge to act with the urge to be legitimate?
 - How were the humanitarian imperatives balanced against the legal difficulties in the decision-making process? How did advocates deal with the dilemma of supporting possibly illegal action? In view of this dilemma, how did advocates and politicians legitimize their interventionist cause? What can be learned for the future?
 - After the Kosovo precedent, is there a need to adhere to international law in future? Are HR/humanitarian responses above the law?
 - Can R2P be built into the UN Charter? Need we always wait for the UNSC? Could HR/humanitarian intervention be an accepted justification of action without UNSC approval, rather like self-defense?
-
- How was inaction ruled out? How was the 'no ground troops' decision arrived at? Was there any discussion of the argument that a more robust intervention (including ground troops) would have been necessary to ensure a minimal loss of life?
 - Why did NATO not plan for and send in ground forces after Clark warned Albright of Milosevic's intentions on 6 Mar. 1999 (Clark – *Waging Modern War*)?
 - How did the Administration determine the various restrictions to be imposed on the intervention force (air only, 15,000 ft, etc.)? What were the influences and their weights upon these decisions?
 - How were NATO lives weighed against ethnic-Albanian lives?
 - How is the decision not to use ground troops to protect directly ethnic-Albanians consistent with the humanitarian justification of the mission?

- Why did NATO's the "measures of merit" not include success in saving Kosovar lives? If this was an HR/humanitarian mission, surely this should have been a key indicator (Clark – "The Strength of an Alliance")? *P#?*
- If US policy was motivated by humanitarian concerns, why did humanitarians not have a voice in senior policy deliberations? Does this suggest that humanitarianism was not a key motivating factor? (Blanton)
- Has the 'virtual war' undertaken in Kosovo set paralyzing standards for minimizing casualties in future humanitarian interventions?
- Why intervene in Kosovo for humanitarian reasons, as opposed to the Kurdish areas, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, etc?
- Would Clinton have acted if it were not for the Bosnian and Rwandan precedents? To what extent did these influence the decision-making process?
- To what extent did the interaction between the US and its NATO allies mold and inform US policy, and vice versa? Did international opinion and pressure (e.g. from the EU, UK, UN) influence US policy? If so, in what ways, and to what extent?
- To what extent was the US interested in establishing a right of intervention in perceived humanitarian crises, whether through NATO or otherwise, without UN backing (Johnstone)?
- Why was Camp Bondsteel established in the Balkans? What is its precise location? To what extent did the advantages of establishing a strategic base at a European crossroads influence the US decision to intervene? Was this a useful by-product of the campaign, or a motivating factor in the intervention (Johnstone)?
- *? Who?* Several authors suggest that the Clinton Administration led the US top-down on the Kosovo decision. That is, it created the political will to act across the nation, rather than the public and other advocates doing so. Is this true? Why was it the perception of the Administration? In what way did this influence the decision-making process?
- Would Kosovo intervention have happened if it had not been led top-down?
- Are interventions more likely to go ahead if led top-down?
- If Clinton led the US Public, how did he go about this? What were the key elements in his arguments? Were they successful? How important was the promise of minimal casualties?
- Did the administration deliberately manipulate the public through control of information reaching the media? If so, why? Was this considered necessary to gain public support? Was it successful? To what extent was this unethical? Can Advocacy groups learn from this? Should they attempt to simplify situations, distill complex issues into black and white choices? Would this raise greater public support? Would it be ethical? If they do not, then how will they counter those wishing to complicate issues in order to avoid action, which is a standard strategy of those opposing humanitarian intervention?
- To what extent has Kosovo set a precedent in cases of humanitarian intervention?

- Halperin and Steinberg suggest the US might take similar action in future to prevent/stop HR/humanitarian gross abuses, where it is able, and where its interests are at stake. What does this mean in practice? How will the US decide what is a gross HR/humanitarian abuse? How will it decide when it is able or otherwise? What does it mean by its interests, and how will it determine whether or not they are sufficiently threatened? Must there be a threat to US interests for it to act? Are there official guidelines now adopted to resolve these issues? What are they? Are they consistent with R2P? What are the similarities/differences?
- What are the key documents to seek in the archives? Is it likely these will be declassified upon request?
- What would you have done differently in hindsight?
- What lessons have you learned from the Kosovo experience for the future?

Canada

Owing to the lack of published information on Canadian decision-making with regard to Kosovo, W2I Project research in this respect must rely almost exclusively on the planned interview phase. Some basic questions are outlined below. These should be expanded upon based upon the final phase of the literature analysis and from information garnered from the first few Canadian interviews or pilot interviews?.

- Was Canadian policy spearheaded by Axworthy? If so, why? What is the connection between the concept of 'human security' and the decision to join the NATO campaign in Kosovo? Is there a connection between deciding to intervene in Kosovo and efforts to revive the Canadian Armed Forces?
- Was Axworthy a "humanitarian hawk"? If so, why? Why did his arguments win the day? Who supported them? What were the counterarguments, and who made these? Who took the decision to adopt this particular policy, and why?
- What were the respective roles of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and CIDA in decision making on Kosovo?
- How did proponents of joining the NATO intervention grapple with the suggestion that an air campaign would not be sufficient to ensure a minimal loss of life on the ground?
- How did Canada's image as a peacekeeper affect its decision making on Kosovo? Its role as a middle power?
- If Rwanda demonstrated that there are competing philosophical approaches to humanitarian intervention from Quebec and English Canada, did this policy bifurcation influence decision making in Kosovo? Did Canadian inaction vis-à-vis Rwanda influence decision making in Kosovo?

- Why did Axworthy and Eggleton choose not to appear in the public hearings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade investigation of the Kosovo intervention?
- Haglund argues that Canada acted primarily because of humanitarian reasons. However, in addition, he contends Canada was also motivated by the urge to be a good ally and the wish to secure a credible voice during negotiations on the world stage. Are the motives suggested for the author Canada's real reasons for action? What were the real reasons? What weight was given to ~~these~~ each reason/influence in the decision-making process?
- What is Canada's current position with regard to humanitarian intervention – is UN endorsement required or simply preferred? Are there guidelines for when Canada might intervene without UN endorsement for humanitarian reasons? What are these? Are they contained in R2P? Can they be used to encourage/legitimize Canadian response when UN is slow to react? Can the Kosovo intervention, without UN endorsement, be used as a precedent when lobbying for future Canadian military intervention on humanitarian grounds?
- Looking back on Kosovo in light of today's developments, would Canadian decision makers argue that, to protect humanitarian values, the best policies and practices were engaged? In light of the R2P norm and Canada's sponsorship of the process that resulted in its development, are there lessons to be gleaned from Kosovo that can be applied to Darfur and to future R2P situations?

NGO Practitioners/Advocates

- What have been the strategies used by you and your colleagues to influence US/Canadian government policy? What are the ways you attempt to gain access to government decision makers? What are the obstacles you face in your efforts to influence decision makers? Do the obstacles emerge from problems of access? Do they emerge from issues internal to the NGO/advocacy community? Do humanitarian/human rights organizations spend more time working to influence the policies of states, like Canada/US, or international organizations like the UN?
- How did you and your organization attempt to influence the US/Canadian governments on their policy making vis-à-vis Rwanda/Kosovo? Do you feel you had an impact? If so, how? If not, why not?
- If you have had contact with decision makers in government, how would you characterize these interactions? When politicians and decision makers consider engaging in humanitarian intervention, do you believe it is out of a commitment to humanitarian principles or as a result of political interests? Does this distinction matter from the perspective of humanitarian or human rights advocates? Would it ever be beneficial for humanitarian or human rights advocates to oppose a government's decision to intervene if it is very clearly

based on political interests rather than on humanitarian or human rights norms and principles?

- If you and your organization endorsed particular policy actions, what were they? How did you and your colleagues decide on which tactics to use in attempting to influence the US/Canadian government? How did you decide on the particular policy recommendation that you and your colleagues advanced?
- Stoddard (2006) suggests that humanitarian NGOs in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were best able to influence US government decision making by providing information about what was happening on the ground. If this information function the best way for humanitarian NGOs to have a policy impact?
- There is a tension between calling for, and receiving, international protection for the delivery of humanitarian aid and calling for the international political will to act militarily to prevent or stop genocide. Has this tension been faced by yourself and your organization? How has it been resolved? Are you pleased or displeased with the ways you and your organization have dealt with this?
- What are the similarities and differences in the ways that humanitarian and human rights advocates can address the US/Canadian governments to promote intervention in genocides and mass atrocity crime?
- From the perspective of your organization, yourself, and human rights/humanitarian concerns, was the intervention in Kosovo worthwhile? Why or why not? If not, could it have been better engaged? How? What is your perspective on why there was intervention in Kosovo but not in Rwanda (or other cases)?
- Based on past experiences, what are the ways your organization can best work to operationalize R2P in Canada/US? Does R2P advocacy have to target particular political parties or should it engage all parties in the US/Canadian political systems? In your estimation, is it possible and/or desirable to build a coalition of humanitarian and human rights organizations to engage in ongoing advocacy to promote the political will to intervene in cases of genocide and mass atrocity crime?
- To best ensure that the US/Canadian governments develop the political will to intervene, must advocacy efforts reconcile R2P with current concerns with international security in a post-9/11/Iraq world? What is your best explanation for lack of political will to intervene in Darfur? What efforts are you and your organization making to address this?

Conclusion: W2I Project Strategic Recommendations

This concluding section presents several strategic recommendations for the W2I Project that flow from the material discussed above. The research team can weigh these recommendations in planning to execute the subsequent phases of the project.

- **Strategic Recommendation #1:** Complete the outstanding literature analysis with an eye towards the first ~~RSC~~ ^{Workshop} ('concepts') meeting and W2I interviews.

As stated above, learning more about Canadian decision making in relation to Rwanda, Kosovo, and humanitarian intervention in general is an important priority. The research team should decide what other areas should be addressed in the literature analysis and set a final work task on this to be completed prior to the first RSC meetings. While the literature analysis is being completed, the research team should think about, and identify, the core themes and issues to be discussed with members of the first RSC as it works on developing its final list of interviewees and interview questions.

- **Strategic Recommendation #2:** Assemble the W2I research team before booking the first ~~RSC~~ ^{Workshop} meeting.

Recently, W2I has faced competing needs to assemble a new research team and book dates for the first RSC as soon as possible. This report recommends assembling and initiating the team *prior* to setting the date of the first ~~RSC~~. Once the team is assembled and commences work, the ~~RSC~~ date can be set for six weeks following this time if all duties and objectives have been clearly and reasonably defined. Sufficient time is needed now, however, to ensure that the team is properly assembled. If there are compelling reasons to set the date for the first RSC now, select a conservative date that will give W2I the maximum reasonable amount of time between now and that date to establish the new team.

- **Strategic Recommendation #3:** Follow-up with RSC plans hatched at 3 January, 2008 W2I Project meeting.

Names of RSC members to be invited were divided up between FC and RD at the recent project meeting. All efforts should be made to follow-up with members who have already agreed to participate in the RSC and to recruit outstanding members. Recommendation #3 should be acted upon in consultation with recommendation #2.

- **Strategic Recommendation #4:** The research team will work best by employing a well-defined division of labour.

Once the research team is assembled and work tasks are defined for the subsequent phases of the project, the work tasks should be divided such each member of the team is independently responsible for specific tasks. Regular consultation on each

member's progress and concerns is helpful, but specialization of tasks will best ensure the efficient completion of defined goals.

- **Strategic Recommendation #5:** Set specific and achievable goals for W2I work tasks.

Once work tasks are identified by the research team, realistic goals in terms of completion dates should be agreed upon ^{key} by members of the research team. Each member can be responsible for the completion of his/her individual task, but members of the team should be aware of the overall goals of the team and should work to ensure that work tasks are completed within the timeframe identified.

- **Strategic Recommendation #6:** Establish an effective and systematic working relationship between the research team, the Project Leader (FC), and the Project Director (RD).

At the 3 January, 2008 W2I Project meeting, it was determined that RD's role would centre on helping the research team connect with potential interviewees, helping with project fundraising, and attending, as much as possible, all ^{RSC + workshop} consultation meetings. FC will continue in his role as advising the research team and fundraising. This report recommends that, following the joint definition of broad and immediate project goals, the W2I research team establishes conditions to allow it to work as independently as possible on executing set objectives. Given the number of tasks to be completed, and the timeline under which the project will be working, the research team should operate with as much autonomy as is reasonably possible given the organizational structure of the project as whole. While there is certainly overlap, to ensure maximum efficiency and productivity, the work of the W2I research team should be distinct from general MIGS work as much as possible.

- **Strategic Recommendation #7:** Maintain and advance project fundraising efforts as much as possible.

As suggested by RD at the 3 January, 2008 W2I Project meeting, the project goals are ambitious and may take longer than is currently conceived in the project milestones. Extra resources to pay the research team and administrative staff might be necessary if work extends beyond current time assessments. Fundraising efforts must be maintained and possibly increased to ensure that the project will be funded to the extent that it can deal with unexpected delays.

- **Strategic Recommendation #8:** If grant-writing becomes an objective for W2I early in 2008, try to task this to one member of the research team.

Grant-writing is a job in itself. W2I has previously identified several possible agencies and foundations (IDRC, CIDA, Omidyar) from which to seek research funds. To most efficiently pursue this strategy for raising funds, one member of the research team (or the Project Administrator) should be responsible for most of the

tasks associated with preparing grant applications and/or letters. Consultation on this is important, but not to the extent that it will drag other team members away from their comprehensive individual tasks for which they are responsible.

- **Strategic Recommendation #9:** Complete the Concordia University research on human subjects ethics forms ASAP

This must be a high-priority item to be initiated and completed as soon as possible to avoid unnecessary delays in commencing the interview stage. As stated above, the MIGS computer (in the W2I file) contains research ethics forms recently completed by Erin Jessee. These can be consulted for guidance. The preliminary interview questions can be easily used for this process. Again, try to task this to one member of the team for greatest efficiency.

- **Strategic Recommendation #10:** Hire a project administrator ASAP

As per RD's suggestion at the 3 January, 2008 W2I Project meeting, the sooner an administrator is hired, the sooner W2I will be able to get to work on core tasks such as: planning the first RSC, developing plans for arranging interviews, planning how to best manage project funds.

Appendix A

W2/ Literature Analysis Control Schedule

Level of Atrocities			Relevance			Accessibility of Information			Prioritization		
Low	Medium	High	Canada	US	Today	Good	Medium	Poor	Low	Medium	High

Primary Cases

The Former Yugoslavia (1992-present)	*		*	*	*	*					X
Somalia (1992-1993)	*		*	*	*	*					X
Rwanda (1994-1996)			*	*	*	*					X
Kosovo (1999)	*		*	*	*	*					X
Darfur (2003-present)			*	*	*	*					X

Secondary Cases

East Pakistan (1971)			*	*	*	*					X
Burundi (1972)			*	*	*	*					X
East Timor (1972 - present)		*	*	*	*	*					X
Cambodia (1978)			*	*	*	*					X
Guatemala (1978-1996)		*	*	*	*	*					X
Uganda (1979)			*	*	*	*					X
Congo (1999-present)		*	*	*	*	*		*			X

Tertiary Cases

Liberia (1990-1997)		*		*	*	*			*		X
Northern Iraq (1990-1991)		*		*	*	*			*		X
Haiti (1994-1997)		*		*	*	*			*		X
Sierra Leone (1997-present)		*		*	*	*			*		X
Afghanistan (2001-present)	*			*	*	*			*		X
Iraq (2003-present)	*			*	*	*			*		X

Support Cases

Ottoman Empire (1894-1909)		*		*	*	*				X	
Ottoman Empire (1915)			*	*	*	*					X
Ukraine (1932-1933)			*					*		X	
Nazi-occupied Europe (1941-1945)			*	*	*	*			*	X	
Congo (1960)	*					*				X	
Stanleyville (1964)	*					*				X	
Dominican Republic (1965)	*					*				X	
Argentina (1976-1983)	*			*	*	*				X	
Chile (1973-1990)	*			*	*	*				X	
Shaba (1978)	*							*		X	
Central African Republic (1978)	*							*		X	
Grenada (1983)	*			*	*			*		X	
Sri Lanka (1983 - present)	*							*		X	
Panama (1989)	*			*	*			*		X	

Analogous Cases

HIV/AIDS Intervention											
Global Warming											
Famine / Drought Relief											
Deforestation											

Birth Control
via contraception + "family planning" (Guttmacher)

Appendix B

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Appendix B, Continued

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